adrift from social and cultural relations that heavily shape economic exchange in preindustrial societies. Hence, economic behavior is embedded in social and cultural relations in preindustrial societies more than is the case in industrial societies. Granovetter (1985) suggests that the opposite is the case, that economic action is embedded in social relations in industrialized societies more than is the case in preindustrial and industrializing societies. Following Granovetter's thesis, a tremendous amount of work and discourse on the embeddedness of economic behavior has taken place (Beckert, 1996; DiMaggio, 1990; Romo and Schwartz, 1995; Uzzi, 1996; Waldinger, 1995; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) . This work has focused on analyzing embeddedness in industrialized societies, and has overemphasized the role of social and cultural relations in economic action to the extent of dispensing with the role of individual effort.
In this paper, I examine the effect of illness and death of household food security to explain the dynamics of embeddedness among rural households in Malawi, a developing country, and contend that economic action is indeed embedded in social and cultural relations but in such a way that collective weal shapes individual efforts. Rural farm household (2) members in Malawi do not act to maximize utility but to safeguard, within the social and cultural networks of ties, the positions, status, and advantages for themselves and their households. Rural Malawi household members are not individualistic as envisioned by the neoclassical utilitarian view. Instead, they are what Smelser (1978) and Swedberg et al (1990) term social agents, and their actions are guided by social rationality, as the embeddedness view would suggest. Food security in rural Malawi is hence contingent both upon individual efforts in households and upon collective processes. These processes involve (1) significant sharing of endowments and commodity bundles, sharing that is legitimated and institutionalized by entitlement systems and relations, and (2) negotiation among members within and across households in their production and consumption activities. Afflictions such as illness and death disrupt entitlement systems and relations, thereby reconstituting the structure of embeddedness and compromising food security.
Entitlements and the embeddedness of food security In this paper, I follow the conventional definition of food security: the access to enough food by a population for a healthy and active life (Braun et al, 1992; Chen and Kates, 1994; Salih, 1995; Schulthes, 1994; World Bank, 1986) . Fundamental in this view of food security are entitlement systems and relations that govern the production, possession, and use of food. Entitlement systems comprise rules, expectations, and beliefs about the distribution of resources, goods, and services in a population (Richards, 1983; 1986) . Within entitlement systems are entitlement relations, which refer to the range of commodity bundles a person commands, given unique endowment or ownership and exchange opportunities (Sen, 1981; 1984) . According to Sen (1981, page 2), a person can command commodity bundles through trade, production, sale of own-labor power, or inheritance and transfer entitlements. A person could thus be unable to command enough food and starve because his or her entitlement relations are unfavorable. I draw upon the entitlement systems and entitlement relations propositions to explain the embeddedness of food security in social and cultural ties, and how illness and death in this era of the AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) epidemic in rural Malawi weakens these ties, making households vulnerable to food insecurity.
(2) The term`household' has diverse interpretations. Following Friedmann (1978; , I define a household in subsistence terms. A household is thus a social entity whose members subsist from the same source. A rural farm household comprises members cultivating the same plots and eating from the same granary. A polygamous family has different households when the different wives and their children cultivate different plots and eat from different granaries.
The fundamental argument I make in this paper is that (1) individual interests, largely anchored in individuals' rights to resources, goods, and services or entitlements, and (2) collective preferences, sanctioned by entitlement systems, are important aspects in food security dynamics. Individuals indeed inherit property or goods, accept gifts, sell own-labor power, or engage in trade to command commodity bundles. However, these endowments and exchange activities are undertaken within entitlement systems with collective rules, expectations, and obligations, amidst social and cultural relations that shape how individuals undertake the activities, and under circumstances where the means for commanding commodity bundles are adequate. When the means are inadequate at the individual level and, more importantly, inadequate at the collective level, the endowment and exchange entitlements collapse, food security gets compromised, and rural households become vulnerable. Food insecurity therefore is a result of endowment contraction and exchange entitlements shifting unfavorably (Devereux, 1993) but both at the individual and at the collective level. As Richards (1983, page 46) puts it,``famine is the result of the collapse of an established entitlement system'' because food production, possession, and use are embedded in that system of beliefs, rules, expectations, and obligations amidst an interplay of social and cultural ties through which exchange occurs. From an entitlement system and entitlement relations perspective, actors are not instrumental öthey do not invest their resources in a calculated and self-serving manner. Instead actors are social ötheir individual goals are shaped by social and cultural relations (Granovetter, 1985 (Granovetter, , 1990 Swedberg et al, 1990; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) . Economic and sociological aspects of human action are thus enmeshed, as England and Farkas (1986) , Folbre (1994) , and Frank (1985; have argued. We cannot therefore understand economic action fully without a sociological account of that behavior.
Intense social and cultural ties characterize entitlement systems and relations among rural households in Malawi. Ties are the result of kinship, sharing the same geographical space, having similar values and aspirations, pursuing similar goals, or the result of cultural imperatives. Through ties, people develop expectations and obligations or`senses of duty' to one another. Through these expectations and obligations, people feel they owe favors to each other (Gouldner, 1960) and hence draw upon their individual entitlements as they help one another when in difficulty, when a household or individual is in need, or just as a social duty.
Expectations and obligations are governed by collective rules or norms, which guide how people help and respond to each other's problems and needs, and how they perform social duties. The norms set expected responses to given situations. An ill person needs help; healthy individuals in the household or other households in the neighborhood are expected and obliged to provide that help. A bereaved family needs to be consoled; other families in a collective are expected and obliged to do so. A household experiencing food shortage asks for help; the household with enough food is obliged and expected to share. Obligations are pledges that facilitate the diffusion of help across households in times of problem or need, or in households merely responding to social duties based on expectations. Coleman (1988, pages s102^s103) views obligations as`credit slips' drawn upon when an individual or household is in crisis.
Inasfar as people help each other in response to expectations and obligations, food security cannot be based on individual household effort alone but on collectives of households sharing in the production and consumption of food as well. Food security is embedded in collective processes that involve social and cultural relations within entitlement systems that shape entitlement relations. What if illness and death strike? The embeddedness view would suggest that these afflictions reduce the labor endowment in an afflicted household, which unfavorably influences the household's command over food. However, if there is enough labor and food at the collective level, and if mechanisms of sharing the labor and food are in place, the afflicted household may not suffer from inadequate labor and food supply because other households will share their labor and food with the afflicted one. Illness and death would thus compromise food security and predispose households to vulnerability (3) only when the afflictions reach a threshold at which they reduce the labor and food supply at the collective level. When this threshold is reached, sharing of resources, goods, and services becomes a social liability and declines because healthy households are overwhelmed by the increasing number of suffering ones. The entitlement system weakens, entitlement relations become more parsimonious, and the role of social and cultural relations in food security diminishes. The embeddedness structure becomes unfavorable to the collective wellbeing. With the AIDS epidemic in Malawi, levels of illness and death may already have reached a threshold that is not only destroying household food security at the individual household level but at the collective as well. This research explores this proposition.
The research and its methodology Many young adults contract AIDS in Malawi. There were 17 confirmed AIDS cases in 1985. By 1997 the cumulative number of AIDS cases increased to 50 975; 80% of these were aged 20 to 49 years (MNACP, 1997) . (4) The situation is worse in some areas than in others. The research was undertaken in Balaka and Mponela rural areas of Malawi (see figure 1 ), which in 1995 had as many as 43.4% and 34.5% case returns, (5) respectively (MNACP, 1995) .
Both Balaka and Mponela have urbanizing centers where populations are denser and trade is significant. Because the incidence of AIDS is higher in urban than in rural areas of Malawi (MNACP, 1993) , I sampled households near and far from the centers to test whether proximity to these centers influenced the incidence of illness and death, and their effect on the embeddednes of food security amidst the AIDS epidemic. Fieldwork was thus carried out in four areas: Balaka Near and Mponela Near, which were within 6 km of urban centers, and Balaka Far and Mponela Far, 25 km or more from the nearest centers. In each area about 10% of the households were sampled in geographically contiguous villages. This yielded 31 study households in Balaka Near, 34 in Balaka Far, 27 in Mponela Near, and 31 in Mponela Far, totaling 123. Each sampled household was subjected to structured interviews, conducted weekly for ten consecutive weeks starting the first week of December 1995 and ending the second week of (3) The term`vulnerability' has been used to analyze the plight of poor rural households as capitalism penetrates the countryside (Devereux, 1993, pages 121^124) . The argument is that capitalist penetration of rural subsistence economies disrupts their ability to cope with crises such as droughts. In similar ways, we can argue that problems such as the AIDS epidemic, when they penetrate rural subsistence economies, may be disrupting the coping abilities of rural households, thereby making them more vulnerable. (4) The Malawi National AIDS Control Program (MNACP) collects data from 61 AIDS-testing centers spread all over the country. HIV tests are done on patients visiting these centers. The centers send the data to MNACP headquarters, which determines whether a case qualifies as an AIDS case based on the symptoms exhibited and an HIV test. By no means does the information capture the overall picture of AIDS because the tests are done on willing patients visiting the centers. No sample survey research in any of the 61 sites has been undertaken for purposes of HIV tests. Also, some centers send in incomplete dataöthey miss some months. Despite these weaknesses, the MNACP data are the best we have on the AIDS epidemic in Malawi.
(5) Case returns corroborate the incidence of AIDS in an area. A 40% case return means that for every 10 patients examined in a particular testing center and sent to MNACP headquarters, 4 qualified as AIDS cases, that is, based on the symptoms recorded and HIV test results, 4 patients contracted AIDS.
February 1996. December to February is a period when agricultural operations are at their peak, labor supply in agriculture is most critical, and food shortage is most acute (UNM and MG, 1993; MG, 1994) .
Household food security was measured in terms of the amount of maize (the staple food for Malawi rural households) a household commanded, that is, the maize a household produced plus the potential amount of maize a household could buy with its cash income less the amount of maize needed (6) by a household to feed its members. A positive number shows that a household was food secure, that it commanded adequate maize.
There were two categories of household food-security predictors. The first were production based and own-labor entitlements, two of the entitlements Sen (1981; 1984) discusses. In this research, these comprised the amount of land a household cultivated, the land:labor ratio, use of ganyu , provision of ganyu, and maize yield. The land:labor ratio is the amount of land per unit of persons 10 years or older in a household. Ganyu is casual labor used or provided by a household to meet some labor (6) To determine the maize needed by a household, the amount of calories required by a household were computed based on the number of household members, and their sexes and ages because different age and sex categories require different amounts of calories daily (Maletnlema and West, 1987) . Other factors taken into account in computing the maize needed in a household were (1) that maize provides 73% of calories in a Malawian rural household (Chimwaza, 1982) and (2) that 100 g of white maize, the type produced in Malawi, yields 334 calories (Maletnlema and West, 1987) .
shortage, to return a favor, or to acquire some food, income, and other goods. Use of ganyu is the frequency with which a household used casual labor to supplement its household labor on its farm. Provision of ganyu is the frequency with which a household provided casual labor elsewhere to obtain food, income, or to return a favor. Maize yield was the amount of maize produced per hectare. The second set of foodsecurity predictors comprised illness and death measures. Illness was measured in terms of the frequency with which male and female household guardians were ill and cared for the ill during the ten-week fieldwork period. Death was measured in terms of the frequency with which female and male guardians attended funerals during the same period and the number of household members who died during the period 1990^95. The quantitative data were supplemented by qualitative data collected through indepth unstructured interviews of household guardians, and observations of what the study households did when faced with illness, death, and food shortage.
Research findings
I use the quantitative data to examine the effect of production-based and own-labor entitlements on food security, and also how illness and death may adversely influence food security. I draw upon the qualitative data to document labor-exchange and foodexchange activities so as to corroborate the role of social and cultural ties, embedded in the entitlement system, in the sharing of labor and food, and in insuring household food security amidst illness and death.
Findings from quantitative data analyses Table 1 summarizes how the different household food-security predictors were measured, and their sample means and standard deviations. Table 2 (see over) presents means and frequencies. The data in table 2 reveal two main points of interest for this paper. First, 39 of the 123 study households (32%) were food insecure. Areas farther away from urbanizing centers seemed to have relatively more food-insecure households than those near the centers. In Mponela Near and Balaka Near, both areas being near urbanizing centers, 15% and 29% of the households, respectively, were food insecure. As many as 36% of households in Mponela Far and 44% in Balaka Far, on the other hand, were food insecure. The differences between areas near urbanizing centers and those far from these centers notwithstanding, and despite a high number of households whose food supply was insufficient in the research areas, the overall household food security across and in the research areas was surprisingly satisfactory.
Second, according to the data, the frequency of guardians' illness and deaths per household were rather high in all the research areas. The male guardians were ill at least once per week for 3.34 weeks during the 10-week research period. The frequency with which male guardians were ill was as high as 4.35 and 4.07 in Balaka Near and Mponela Far, respectively. The frequency of female guardians' illness averaged 1.71, ranging from 1.51 in Balaka Near to 2.01 in Mponela Near. The incidence of deaths per household averaged 0.69 persons over the 1990^95 period, being as high as 0.92 and 0.81 in Mponela Near and Balaka Near, respectively. Funerals and taking care of the ill also took up a significant amount of guardians' time. Female guardians attended funerals and cared for the ill at least once a week for 5.16 and 5.94 weeks, respectively, during the 10 weeks. Male guardians attended funerals and took care of the ill at least once a week for 2.74 and 3.58 weeks, respectively.
Most of the ill and deceased in the Balaka areas exhibited AIDS-related symptoms, suggesting that the incidence of AIDS in Balaka was higher than in Mponela. Despite the differences in AIDS incidence, there were no significant differences in the overall incidence of illness of guardians and deaths per households across the research areas.
This implies that, even without AIDS, the incidence of illness and death in rural areas of Malawi is grave. It also suggests that proximity of village households to urban centers has an insignificant effect (at least so far) on the amount of household labor that illness and death take up.
The ordinary least squares estimates in table 3 suggest a rather interesting relationship between illness and death, entitlement relations, and household food security in rural Malawi. Entitlement relations have an overwhelming influence on household food security. The production-based and own-labor entitlements: amount of land cultivated, amount of land per unit of labor in a household, maize yield, and use and provision of ganyu explained 59% of the variance in household food security (see model 1 in table 3). We can conclude that entitlements improve household food security and must indeed be given their due attention in food policies (Dre© ze and Sen, 1989; Dre© ze et al, 1995; MG, 1994; UNM and MG, 1993) . Their influence over food security is shaped by the structure of embeddedness, that is, the manner in which relations are patterned and through which resources, goods, and services are exchanged. With specific reference to labor in rural Malawi, households that cultivated more than a hectare of land used the most ganyu labor. These are the households that experience the greatest labor shortage in their farming activities; they are also the households that are generally food secure. On the other hand, households that cultivated the least land provided the most ganyu labor. They are also the households that are least food secure. These findings suggest that the food-insecure households have surplus labor that they offer to food-secure households without affecting their production activities because they cultivate little land. The relationship between food-secure and food-insecure households epitomizes the use of labor in rural Malawi. When illness and death are introduced into the model, the embeddedness of food security and its structure are more pronounced. First, illness and death explain 3% more variance than in model 1 (see model 2 in table 3). (7) Among the illness and death variables, however, only`female guardians' attendance of funerals' significantly reduced a The following food security predictors: use of ganyu, provision of ganyu, and all illness and death measures except death per household and number of households experiencing AIDSrelated illness are frequencies. The other predictors are means.
(7) There was high collinearity between`illness of male guardians',`male guardians caring for the ill', and`male guardians attending funerals'. Of the three, I used the`male guardians attending funerals' variable. The model predicted food security better with this variable than when either of the other two were used.
household food security when other predictors were controlled for. The rest had an insignificant effect. This is surprising given the high levels of illness, caring for the ill, attendance of funerals, and deaths per household (see table 2 ). High levels of illness and death obviously stressed households and made it difficult for them to carry out their production activities efficiently. How is it, then, that there is little evidence that those households heavily impacted by illness and death are not relatively worse off than their neighbors? How is it that households in which adult caretakers are ill or dying do not seem to have significantly less food than their neighbors? The neoclassical utilitarian view would contend that illness and death in rural Malawi have not reached a threshold where households are unable individually to produce enough food to meet their consumption needs. Such a suggestion is misleading because it focuses on the household as the unit of analysis and does not honor the role of social and cultural processes in household food security. In-depth unstructured interviews and observations revealed that social and cultural relations influence not only food production but also the way households deal with illness and death, a finding that supports the embeddedness view. Through relations, households share resources, goods, and services, thereby collectively insuring their food production and supply, and diffusing the illness and death burdens. Case stories of labor and food exchanges among households amidst illness and death reveal the nature of the social and cultural processes, and their effect on food security.
Case stories of labor and food exchanges in rural Malawi
Veneta is a single mother with enough food. Through her food, she has access to the labor of food-insecure households who provide ganyu to her in exchange for food. In the process, Veneta is able to carry out farm operations on her hectare and a half of land on time; and the food-insecure households are able to meet some of their food needs. Ganyu has been a vital resource to Veneta. She once reported in an interview: ``I went to my farm last week Wednesday only to find five women working in it. I was surprised to find them working in my farm [she really was not] . Inquiring what they were up to, they told me they had come to provide ganyu, .. that they knew I had some maize and needed some for their families.'' Veneta did not dismiss the women. Instead, she joined in the work, all of them working on the same part of the farm. Two of the five women had small babies on their backs, which made it difficult for them to do as much work as the others. When it was time to be remunerated for their work, all five women received the same amount of maize. There was a lot of bargaining on the quantity of maize the women were being paid but it was all part of the social bonding necessary for the five women to come again to provide ganyu, and for Veneta to continue benefiting from their labor. It is important to note here that the five women went to provide ganyu at Veneta's farm without first formally making a request to Veneta. Their decision to work at her farm was based on their judgment that she would be able to share her maize with them. Through information networks, the women knew that Veneta had enough maize to spare some and that she was the kind of woman who would empathize with their situations. Veneta obliged, allowing them to continue working and even joining in the work.
Another interesting matter is that not all the women did the same amount of work. Those who had babies did much less work but were paid the same. There were no open complaints from the other women who did more work. The ganyu was thus a collective activity for the five women that insured that the two women who could not get enough food if they provided ganyu alone acquired as much food as the other three women. In this way, the burden of food supply was diffused across the households.
One would think that Malijani's household, another case, had fourteen members. Its actual size is eight. The other six people are in-laws, nieces, nephews, and other households' children from Malijani's relatives and friends who are short of food. Malijani has adequate maize although he never acknowledges that. It is not surprising, therefore, that the in-laws, nieces, nephews, and friends' children join Malijani's household during the rainy season when food shortage is acute in their households. The dependents are assured of food during their stay. Malijani is obliged to share his food with these needy people. Asked why he took them into his household, he responded`H ow could I leave them to suffer when I have some food to share ... you know they help with farm work too!'' Indeed, Malijani benefits from the labor of these dependents. He once joked that they were training``to be hard-working men and women''. It is obvious that, without these dependents' labor, Malijani may not be able to cultivate his 3 ha of land on time and produce the adequate food he does. He needs extra labor and the dependents provide that labor but benefit from the food that Malijani provides.
Chiundiza, a third case, is an elderly lady with twelve grandchildren to take care of. Chiundiza took over the care of these children after her three daughters, who mothered them, died from AIDS-related complications. Realizing that she is getting weaker as she is getting older, Chiundiza struck a`contractual' deal with a young man in the village. The young man works on Chiundiza's 1 ha farm plot. His remuneration is a portion of the produce at harvest time. If there is very little harvest, the young man stands to lose. Asked why he got into such a seemingly unfavorable arrangement, the young man responded``The frail lady needs some help and she asked me for that help ... how could I refuse to help?'' The previous growing season, the same young man had a similar arrangement with Chiundiza. They harvested an appreciable amount. Chiundiza took up most of the harvest but the young man got a sizable portion. In the process, both Chiundiza and the young man's households benefited from the land that Chiundiza had but could not cultivate because she was elderly and frail. It is obvious that the death of her three daughters left Chiundiza with the burden of taking care of twelve children. The contract with the young man helps Chiundiza to produce some food to feed the children.
Unlike Veneta, Malijani, and Chiundiza, Limani depends on working parties. Limani's household of four cultivates a little over 2 ha. The household does not have enough labor to carry out all farm operations on time. Hence, Limani's household is a member of a group comprising a number of households who work at each other's farms alternatively. At the end of each day, the household being helped treats the group to a feast. Furthermore, Limani organizes working parties of young men and women who come to work at his farm and are treated to a feast of food or given some food or income at the end of the work. The party provides the extra labor Limani needs in exchange for food the young men and women need.
From the foregoing cases, by means of ganyu, moving in and staying with foodsecure households, labor contracting, and working groups or parties, labor and food are shared among households. The land farmed by a household feeds people beyond the household. Apart from farming activities, rural households also share significant labor and food through collective caring of the ill and during funerals. It is common practice that, when people go to visit a sick person or bereaved household, they carry some food or money which they give to the household with the sick person. Also, the ill and bereaved receive some help with their household chores and farm work. At funerals, food is collected from village households for consumption during burial time. Although those who come to the funeral consume most of the food, some of the food remains for the bereaved household to use later on.
Labor and food exchanges abound in rural Malawi, and are characterized by embedded choices in the context of obligations between households.
Embedded choices, entitlements, and food security Inasfar as social and cultural relations play a critical role in economic processes (Coleman, 1988; DiMaggio, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; , social rationality characterizes decisionmaking (Swedberg et al, 1990) , and actors' choices are embedded in the relations among the actors. This would be the case to the extent that actors internalize social norms, and thus develop a sense of collective consciousness and honor expectations and obligations within their entitlement systems. This does not undermine individual initiative; it does not nullify the rights individuals have over their entitlements. In internalizing social norms, actors also attain the ability to reconcile individual and collective goals; they learn where their individual efforts stop and collective efforts take over, when to invest their resources in their households and when to invest them in the collective. Because the existence of a norm implies and sets the stage for its violation (Durkheim, 1960, page 71 ; also see Wrong, 1961, page 191) , social norms would not entail total conformity or lack of choices for actors, but cooperation, flexibility, and contingency in human behavior. Social norms provide opportunities for individual choices, but these choices are embedded in or shaped by collective preferences. Actors acquire negotiation strategies about how and when to act individually or be part of the collective, and how to reconcile individual goals and aspirations with collective expectations and obligations.
The cases discussed above demonstrate embedded choices and negotiation among rural Malawians. Social action among these people is embedded in the networks of ties through which negotiations take place within an entitlement system with no absolute standards of equity, difficult to predict with an economic model, and contingent upon events and historical circumstances (Richards, 1983) . To take the case of Veneta, her decision to allow the women to work on her farm even without prior arrangement took into account her production goals. She also took into account the needs of these women, how the village expected her to act, how her labor needs were met previously, the need to secure a labor supply in the present and future, and how much maize she could spare. A similar pattern of thinking was evident in Malijani's and the other cases discussed. These villagers were surely rational in their decisions but their choices were embedded in the social and cultural ties in that what was beneficial to them involved assessing the burdens others experienced and the social and cultural implications of their decisions. Their utility was conditioned by the burdens experienced by others in their network of relations. Hence, they avoided decisions that could lead to acute social sanctions. Indeed, social activities, which serve to strengthen social bonding between members (Ben-Porath, 1980; England and Farkas, 1986, pages 46^48; Netting, 1993, page 58^62) , very much shape decisionmaking among rural Malawians. Social and cultural relations are not frictional drags, as the neoclassical utilitarian view suggests (Folbre, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; . They are a source of social capital, which enables people to help each other by sharing their resources, goods, and services and thereby enhancing their productivity. Such sharing occurs through reciprocity and redistribution exchange mechanisms.
Reciprocity, redistribution, and food security Reciprocity and redistribution, according to Polanyi (1968) are means of economic integration in preindustrial societies. Reciprocity refers to the exchange of resources, goods, and services between relatives, friends, and neighbors. Redistribution involves some central political, cultural, or religious authority facilitating the exchange. Through redistribution, exchange reaches beyond relatives, friends, and neighbors.
As exchange mechanisms, reciprocity and redistribution create and sustain social and cultural networks of ties between households; they legitimate and institutionalize the entitlement system and relations, that is, they serve (1) to support, rationalize, and justify the sharing of resources, goods, and services, and (2) to create and sustain the rules, expectations, and obligations that define who gets what and when. These principles of social exchange are mediated by needs, problems, crises (illness, death, labor shortage, and food shortage being examples), and opportunities in and across households. Through reciprocity and redistribution, households help each other and deal collectively with economic concerns such as food security and burdens such as illness and death. In helping each other, people create, invest, and spend social capital. The sources of this capital are social and cultural ties upheld by the entitlement system. The use of social capital can be just as productive as financial and physical capital (Coleman, 1987; 1988) ; it can be spent and accumulated. When a household receives help, it is spending its social capital as it draws on help from the collective. In giving help, a household responds to other households' crises, and hence secures and accumulates social capital that it can draw on in future. Responding to crises is collateral for social capital to be drawn in future.
Inasfar as households individually seek to help other households in need, resources, goods, services, and burdens are shared collectively. The collective consciousness is instilled. Food-secure households like Veneta's and Malijani's, which usually need extra labor to cultivate their bigger pieces of land, get that labor from food-insecure ones which need food to survive. Because food-insecure households have surplus labor, partly because they cultivate less land, those that cultivate more land and need more labour naturally draw upon the labor reservoir among the food-insecure households. Through these exchanges, food security is collectively insured, facilitated by what Woolcock (1998) terms community linkage and integration processes. To the extent that social and cultural ties are firm, a rural household's labor and food caters for needs, problems, and crises beyond the household because of reciprocity and redistribution.
If reciprocity and redistribution of resources, goods, and services are indeed a response to needs, problems, and crises, then the higher the magnitude of these burdens, the more the reciprocity and redistribution, the higher the exchange of labor and food, and the higher the transaction of social capital. However, the magnitude of burdens (that is, the extent of their spread at both household and collective levels) would reach a threshold at which labor and food supply are collectively so low that reciprocity and redistribution become social liabilities and diminish, thereby adversely affecting food security.
The spread of burdens and food security
The spread of burdens, illness and death to be specific, can be intensive or extensive. As discussed here, the higher the number of the ill and deceased per household and the more serious the illness in the household, the more intensive the afflictions. On the other hand, the greater the number of households afflicted with illness and death in a collective, the more extensive the afflictions.
Because of its focus on the individual household as the unit of analysis, the neoclassical utilitarian view on food security would enable us to capture only the intensive spread and impact of illness and deaths. The embeddedness view, on the other hand, helps us to capture both the intensive and the extensive spread and impact of illness and death on food security. Regression of illness and death variables on household food security (see model 2 in table 3) reveals that not all illness and death variables significantly influence food security except`attendance of funerals by female household guardians'. This may be because attendance of funerals by female households has reached an extensive threshold which compromises food security whereas the other variables have not yet reached that level. Stated differently, attendance of funerals by female household guardians diminishes social capital at the collective level rather than recyling that capital. This activity has reached a level where it is a social liability. Hence, it is effectively reducing the collective labor supply and compromising food security.
When illness and death are intensive, households continue to share their resources, goods, and services, and this contributes to their food security. When they become extensive, the sharing diminishes as there are fewer and fewer healthy households supporting the growing number of afflicted households. Reciprocity and redistribution become social liabilities. The entitlement system collapses and entitlement relations become more parsimonious because the collective problems become stressful. The structure of embeddedness becomes mutually segregated because interpersonal relations get less dense. These factors reduce food security.
Despite the AIDS epidemic, at least so far, the spread of illness and death in rural Malawi is still at such a level that households can contain its impact through reciprocal and redistributive exchange of labor and food. As the AIDS epidemic continues, illness and death may become extensive and households will greatly be vulnerable to AIDS-related food insecurity. The danger of AIDS is rooted in its potential to make illness and death extensive.
Conclusion
Food-security prescriptions in developing societies have generally followed a utilitarian viewpoint. The adjustment of agricultural produce prices has been a main approach for stimulating and stabilizing agricultural productivity (Harrigan, 1997; Harrigan and Mosley, 1991) . These strategies assume that economic processes center mainly around formal rationality (individuals are expected to make calculated and generally selfish decisions) and market dynamics. Also, these strategies presuppose that afflictions such as illness and death compromise food security by affecting individual entitlements. It is not surprising that, when epidemics such as AIDS strike, the control strategies follow a utilitarian line of thinking. AIDS prevention campaigns in Malawi, for example, very much expect individuals to make rational behavioral choices based on information they receive about AIDS. People are expected to avoid AIDS-risky behaviors if they know how deadly those behaviors are. We find, however, that the knowledge of AIDS is high (MG and MI, 1992) yet the spread of AIDS has not abated.
Rebutting the utilitarian thesis, many scholars have argued that social and cultural relations are important in economic activities, that economic action is embedded in these relations (Coleman, 1987 (Coleman, , 1988 Folbre, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1968) . The relations are important in economic activities because they allow people to share their resources, goods, and services through reciprocal and redistributive mechanisms, thereby diffusing burdens and insuring collective welfare. This is made possible because of entitlement systems, that is, the embodiment of beliefs, rules, expectations, and obligations that guide the sharing. In examining whether and how illness and death, in this era of the AIDS epidemic, are affecting food security in rural Malawi, I found some evidence that efforts to secure a food supply and mechanisms of dealing with illness and death are embedded in social and cultural relations. The relations are themselves sustained by the entitlement systems, which shape entitlement relations. Action among rural Malawians follows social rationality (rather than instrumental rationality) in which individuals' goals are shaped by collective preferences. It is therefore unfortunate that food-security strategies in many sub-Saharan Africa countries follow the utilitarian tradition, and that reciprocal and redistributive exchange mechanisms, pervasive in sub-Shararan Africa, have not received their due consideration.
Needless to say, policy prescriptions and strategies that overlook the social and cultural context in development work or in responding to epidemics such as AIDS are bound to have minimal success in developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the many government interventions in food production with assistance from the international community as well as the strategies employed in AIDS prevention have not yielded the expected results. It is important to put social and cultural processes at the center of food-security policy formulations or AIDScontrol programs but to do so without nullifying individual drive and initiative. Instead of focusing on individual households in prescribing food security and AIDS-prevention strategies, we need to focus on collectives of households, be it clans, villages, or communities. Social capital should be cultivated and must complement financial and human capital. Reciprocal and redistributive activities must be encouraged. During this era of AIDS which seems to be still in the intensive mode as I have argued, it is urgent and almost imperative that we take into account social and cultural relations. In due course, the incidence of illness and death may be so extensive that the burden would be overwhelming.
